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This paper aims to identify and compare how international law has been mo-
bilized to fill domestic rule of law gaps regarding the individual accountability 
for gross human rights violations in post-authoritarian transitions in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile. Mapping how courts —especially supreme courts— mobilize 
historical narratives to deal with the past, it argues that not only the institutional 
architecture but also its combination with a substantive historical understanding 
of the nature of the previous regime is important for accountability to happen. It 
explores the argument that in the aftermath of authoritarian rule, broader social 
support of the former regime influences judicial historical interpretation in favor 
of continuity between the authoritarian and democratic legal orders (promoting a 
sense of authoritarian legality adequacy). In the opposite way, broader knowledge 
of human rights violations and political pressure for accountability tend to de-
crease social support for authoritarian provisions, stimulating a perception of legal 
inadequacy that makes rule of law gaps explicit, which favors the use of interna-
tional law as a subsidiary source that provides formal and legitimate legal criteria 
to address past wrongdoing. The wider the recognition of authoritarian rule as an 
unlawful regime, the better the chances that a global norm of individual account-
ability will make its way into domestic courts.
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1. Introduction
This paper aims to identify and compare how international law has been mo-
bilized to fill domestic rule of law gaps regarding the individual accountability 
for gross human rights violations in post-authoritarian transitions in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile. mapping how courts —especially supreme courts— mobilize 
historical narratives to deal with the past, it argues that not only the institutional 
architecture but also its combination with a substantive historical understanding 
of the nature of the previous regime is important for accountability to happen. It 
explores the argument that in the aftermath of authoritarian rule, broader social 
support of the former regime influences judicial historical interpretation in favor 
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of continuity between the authoritarian and democratic legal orders (promoting 
a sense of authoritarian legality adequacy). In the opposite way, broader knowl-
edge of human rights violations and political pressure for accountability tend to 
decrease social support for authoritarian provisions, stimulating a perception 
of legal inadequacy that makes rule of law gaps explicit, which favors the use of 
international law as a subsidiary source that provides formal and legitimate legal 
criteria to address past wrongdoing. The wider the recognition of authoritarian 
rule as an unlawful regime, the better the chances that a global norm of indi-
vidual accountability will make its way into domestic courts 1.
2.  The Use of International Law to Fill Rule of Law Gaps When Dealing 
with Gross Human Rights Violations
Constitutionalism, as viewed in liberal tradition, attributes the role to medi-
ate relations between law and politics to domestic constitutions. In this way, law 
is able to regulate politics, while regulated politics is the channel to legal innova-
tion. From an idealistic point of view, this distinction between law and politics is 
the cornerstone of electoral democracies limited by human rights. The idea of a 
constitution allows the democratic rule of law «paradox», where the popular will 
legitimize governance while it is simultaneously limited by counter-majoritarian 
human rights 2. In this ideal rule of law architecture, «legality» means both «rule-
by-law», i. e., the predictability of formal law, and some sort of legitimation de-
rived from «we the people», i. e., substantive political legitimacy.
Authoritarianism produces a radical disruption in this relation. «Authoritar-
ian legality» 3 may neither relate to the popular will nor be limited by counter-
majoritarian rights. The distinction between law and power crumbles, but in-
stitutional tools of law making and enforcement may keep operating inside a 
formal framework that emulates the predictability of democratic law (the law’s 
consistency) without its substantive legitimacy (the law’s adequacy). Extreme 
experiences such as Nazism, where the majoritarian will is unlimited, or elite 
dictatorships, where both the popular will and counter-majoritarian tools are 
missing, produce a distressing situation in post-authoritarian democracies that 
aim to enforce a constitutional rule of law: how does democratic law relate to the 
legacies of a previous regime based on authoritarian legality?
When looking forward for individual accountability for gross human rights 
violations, a double-edged legal problem arises. On one hand, the use of formal 
but illegitimate rules may lead to injustice; on the other, legal solutions disregard-
ing formal positive law may violate one of the foundations of democratic rule of 
law: no one can be convicted under ex post facto legal provisions 4.
The law’s social adequacy is always imperfect and contingent. democratic 
societies live with high levels of structural dissent stabilized by formal rule of 
1 See also: Torelly, 2016.
2 Habermas, 2001.
3 As first introduced by Anthony pereira, 2005.
4 Neumann, prittwitz, Abrão, joppert Swensson jr., Torelly, 2013.
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law institutions that provide predictability. Looking for accountability to crimes 
perpetrated under the imprimatur of a different legal order may lead to what jon 
Elster defines as a contradiction between forms of legal justice (or, in our terms, 
consistent rules) and «political justice» 5 based on substantive legal criteria (that 
try to recover the law’s adequacy).
A transitional rule of law approach is demanded to balance the needs of the 
law’s adequacy and consistency. In Teitel’s words: «Whereas the conventional 
understanding of the conception of tyranny is the lack of the rule of law as arbi-
trariness, the transitional rule of law in the modern cases illuminates a distinctive 
normative response to contemporary tyranny. From its inception in the ancient 
understanding term “isonomy”, the ideal of the rule of law emerges in response 
to tyranny. In ancient times, isonomy is forged in response to tyranny understood 
as arbitrary and partial enforcement of law. Because prior tyranny associated 
with lawmaking that is both arbitrary and unequal, the ancient understanding 
of the rule of law comprehended both values of security in the law and equal 
enforceability of the law. [...] Where persecution is systematically perpetuated 
under legal imprimatur, where tyranny is systematic persecution, the transitional 
legal response is the attempt to undo these abuses under the law» 6.
In this sense, a transitional rule of law approach, to be applied when authori-
tarian legality damages equality before the law and counter-majoritarian rights 
make legal rules socially inadequate, relies on substantive considerations regard-
ing the legal framework of the previous regime (or what systems theory scholars 
call a «second level dissension») 7. Authoritarian legality relies on formal rules 
that are mostly illegitimate and used to promote or to hide human rights viola-
tions. Amnesty laws may both be used to legitimate peace-making purposes or 
prevent accountability 8.
Substantive analyses on the context and scope of law are fundamental to set 
democratic boundaries for amnesty processes, but this substantive analysis relies 
on substantive understandings of the nature of the past regime that are deeply 
connected to the social perception regarding political violence. In other words, 
a political judgment is necessary. The only way to identify a rule of law gap is to 
recognize some sort of substantive unlawfulness in the formal legal order of the 
previous regime. However, how can this political evaluation of social adequacy 
be legally constrained?
Looking back to transitional justice genealogy 9, one may argue that in its 
first moment, associated with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, international law 
tended to perform as the only rule of law criteria to confront past wrongdoing. 
In theoretical terms, this was only possible because of the very nature of totali-
tarianism: social order in both legal and moral terms was so disorganized that a 
huge perception of inadequacy consolidated, opening avenues to fully disregard 
5 Elster, 2006: 104-105.
6 Teitel, 2002.
7 Neves, 2013: 25-26.
8 AAVV, 2014.
9 As first thought in Teitel, 2013.
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a regime’s formal law. In addition, in practical terms, the victor’s justice was pos-
sible because of Germany’s full defeat in the war.
In less extreme transitional rule of law scenarios, such as those of South 
America’s 1980s and 1990s transitions, when democratic legal institutions had 
to deal with authoritarian legality, two radically distinctive features arose. First, 
transitions were not led by external powers after a massive defeat (Elster’s idea 
of «double-endogenous transition» where disruption and remedy are domestic 
processes) 10. Second, domestic institutions were more able to set up legal crite-
ria with some social adequacy (and maybe even democratic legitimacy). Hence, 
international law appears not as the first or the only but as an alternative legal 
source in decision-making processes regarding transitional issues, offering for-
mal and legitimate rule of law criteria to be applied when domestic courts iden-
tify rule of law gaps, which are understood as severe dysfunctions in the law’s 
social and democratic adequacy.
As domestic courts primarily apply domestic legal provisions, international 
law is mainly mobilized when those courts identify problems in their own legal 
order and have an institutional tool to incorporate non-domestic legal criteria 
into their rationale or normative framework. Thus, a perception of the law’s so-
cial inadequacy together with available institutional ways of domestic-interna-
tional interaction favors the use of international law as legal criteria in domestic 
courts.
When rules «by law» lack rule «of law» legitimacy, one may use international 
law to find formal and legitimate legal criteria to be applied in contentious situa-
tions, recognizing and filling rule of law gaps and improving the social adequacy 
of domestic law under the boundaries and constriction of positive internation-
al law.
3. Making Authoritarian Legality Work
Broader or narrower judicial will to challenge previous authoritarian rule may 
relate to how a justice system operated in the former regime. How was authori-
tarian legality implemented? pereira’s comparative study illuminates key features 
regarding the justice systems in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile during military rule 
and democratization 11. While Argentina’s military junta expelled innumerable 
judges and prosecutors in order to enforce its rule, the justice systems in Brazil 
and Chile supported the military coup and its legality, and limited purges hap-
pen, evincing higher levels of consent between military rulers and legal elites.
The use of military courts to prosecute civilians is another important feature 
to be compared. In Brazil and Chile, military courts have tried civilians accused 
of illegal activities against the regimes. Exclusively military personnel composed 
Chilean courts, while in Brazil, a hybrid model emerged, with courts comprising 
both military and civil judges and with civil courts reporting to military ones and 
10 Elster, 2006: 93.
11 pereira, 2005.
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vice versa. In Argentina, by its terms, the justice system was mostly set aside by 
the regime’s repressive strategies. It comes as no surprise that while Brazil had a 
more «legalized» dictatorship (a «rule by law», not a «rule of law»), Argentina 
became known by its «clandestine» practices, such as kidnappings and forced 
disappearances, with Chile standing in between. A more legalized regime —a 
regime where courts enforce authoritarian legality— brings at least two sets of 
consequences.
Immediately, the availability of the justice system to prosecute political oppo-
nents affects the use of clandestine repressive strategies and the number of capi-
tal victims. The possibility to prosecute opposition members under the primacy 
of laws of exception that allow retrieving political rights, imprisonment and ban-
ishment creates a highly effective institutional tool for controlling and repressing 
society. On the other hand, when the justice system declines to apply exceptional 
measures standing for fundamental rights, the repressive apparatus operates in 
clandestine ways (in other words, under no formal legality or any «rule by law» at 
all). If a political prisoner is arrested and officially put in the State’s custody, the 
chance of murder or disappearance is lower, as someone will be liable for those 
acts. If someone is kidnapped in a clandestine operation, public authorities can 
simply deny any connection to illegal repression.
The number of capital victims (of murdered or forced disappearances) in the 
three countries compared support this hypothesis. While official data for Argen-
tina refer to about 30 thousand capital victims 12, Chile reports about three to nine 
thousand 13, and Brazil, less than 500 14. This does not mean that there was less 
repression in Brazil or in Chile. Rather, the authoritarian governments just used 
different repressive policies, as the justice system was willing to cooperate or not.
However, the long-term consequences are far more severe. Highly institution-
alized authoritarian legality is a byproduct of cooperation between the dictator-
ship leaders and the justice system. Thus, authoritarian legality was institution-
alized not only among military and police personnel but also amid judges and 
prosecutors. This leads to a prevalent culture that justifies authoritarianism and 
its human rights violations as a historical contingency, not as an illegal attempt 
against democracy and the rule of law. In other words, it justifies authoritarian 
rule as adequate (or, at least, acceptable) to a specific historical context.
Authoritarian legality unbalances the law’s social adequacy, becoming a pre-
eminent problem for emerging democracies looking to establish a constitutional 
rule of law. Formal legality constitutes a set of consistent rules that are potentially 
incompatible with democratic principles. Transitional rule of law must rebal-
ance the law’s adequacy and consistence, and few situations are more challenging 
than those regarding amnesties and immunities granted by a former regime to 
its members. In the so-called «age of human rights accountability» 15, those legal 
12 Comisión Nacional sobre la desaparición de personas, Argentina, 2003.
13 Collins, 2011.
14 Brasil, 2007.
15 According to Lessa and payne «the age of accountability has meant that amnesties laws around 
the world have face challenges from domestic, regional, and international courts [...] this tremendous 
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provisions became highly controversial, creating considerable political tension 
in the courts in charge of handling fundamental rights problems, especially con-
stitutional courts 16. To evaluate and rebalance the law’s social adequacy, courts 
equalized political claims in a historical narrative that articulated the authoritar-
ian past within democratic future expectations.
4. Argentina: Breaking with Authoritarian Legality
Argentina illustrates a case of radical rupture with authoritarian legality rep-
resented by impunity measures. The country was the first in the region to put 
on trial gross human rights violations from military rule, and at first, it used only 
domestic law provisions to do so 17. just after the end of military rule, in 1983, im-
punity measures were revoked, and the military junta that had ruled the country 
was prosecuted and convicted. Following this moment of justice, new laws were 
approved in 1986 and 1987, and a number of presidential acts, in 1989 and 1990, 
have in practical terms re-established amnesty to state personnel involved with 
the repression 18. A new constitution was then enacted in 1994, breaking with the 
authoritarian legal order and leveraging the struggle for accountability.
All impunity measures were revoked in 2003, when anti-impunity Law 25.779 
was approved. However, «doubts were expressed [...] concerning the validity of 
the Legislative decision, questioning whether parliament actually had the power to 
terminate a law with retroactive effect» 19. These doubts relate to a wider conten-
tious legal debate on the lawfulness of amnesties to gross human rights violations 
where international law plays a key role. Before and after the passing of the anti-
impunity law, district and appeal courts around Argentina have used international 
law to argue against amnesty. Before, its scope was limited, and thus, it excluded 
gross human rights violations. Afterward, they withdrew domestic statutes of limi-
tation, arguing that certain crimes were not subject to any statute of limitation 
under international law, and claimed that Law 25.779 did not criminalise new 
facts in a retroactive way, as international law had already typified both the specific 
criminal acts and the «crime against humanity» qualification decades before 20.
Yet, in 2001, two years prior to the legislative revocation of the impunity 
measures, in the Poblete/Simon case, a district court declared all impunity mea-
sures that reach crimes against humanity as «legally null and void». The Supreme 
Court confirmed this ruling in 2005 21. To do so, it explicitly used international 
law and quoted the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling in Velazquez 
and unprecedented global progress suggest that we live in an age of accountability in which govern-
ments and international institutions are expected to hold perpetrators of atrocity legally responsible for 
their acts» (Lessa, payne, 2012: Introduction).
16 In line with Gerard Neumann, human rights at the international order and constitutional rights 
at domestic order both refer to the same kind of rights: fundamental rights. Neuman, 2013.
17 Sikkink, 2011: 60-85.
18 See Engstrom, pereira, 2012.
19 Bakker, 2005.
20 parenti, 2010: 3, 9-41.
21 Corte Suprema de justiça da Nação Argentina, 2005.
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Rodrigues vs. Honduras that recognized the so-called «global norm of individual 
accountability», asserting the state duty to investigate and prosecute gross human 
rights violations. Argentinean courts used international law to emphasize that as 
the amnesty provisions were illegal under international law; the anti-impunity 
law was neither typifying «new» crimes with retroactive effects, as those crimes 
previously existed, nor retroacting in pejus, as the original benefice was unlawful.
Argentinean case law illustrates a tendency of convergence between domestic 
and international human rights law with constitutional law. According to jack-
son, convergence happens when domestic courts see themselves as places for the 
implementation of international norms 22. The Argentinean 1994 constitution has 
an explicit provision for convergence. In article 75, it states that international 
human rights treaties such as the American Convention on Human Rights have 
constitutional rank. Thus, when a judicial controversy regarding amnesty legality 
arises, courts were able to mobilize international law as a constitutional-level tool 
to improve the law’s adequacy in reshaping the scope of the state duty to inves-
tigate and prosecute a special set of crimes: those «against humanity». Velazquez 
Rodriguez v. Honduras was not mandatory to apply to Argentina. The interna-
tional ruling binds only Honduras. However, the Supreme Court has used case 
law of the Inter-American Human Rights Court to support its normative argu-
ment for the illegality of the amnesty provisions.
Nonetheless, Argentina’s institutional architecture only partially explains the 
convergence of constitutional norms. Some sort of openness to international law 
is necessary but not sufficient for the enforcement of international norms. In 
Argentina, international law was used to make judges’ arguments regarding the 
illegal nature of the dictatorship more explicit and to demonstrate the existence 
of positive legal boundaries that limit the possible scope of statutes of limita-
tion under exceptional circumstances, as the illegal regime had practiced crimes 
against humanity.
Argentinean courts clearly state that what happened in the country was a 
dictatorship where the rule of law was fully missing and that the former regime 
used the state apparatus to systematically perpetrate gross human violations that 
are not justifiable under any circumstances. Courts historical interpretation of 
the nature of the previous regime (and consequentially, of the substantive quality 
of its formal law) leads to the identification of rule of law gaps that must be filled. 
despite contextual similarities, this substantive historical interpretation of the 
nature of the regime is radically divergent from those found in Chile and Brazil. 
22 In jackson’s typology convergence is «a posture that might view domestic constitutions a site for 
the implementation of international legal norms or, alternatively, as a participant in a decentralized but 
normatively progressive process of transnational norm convergence. [...] such a posture of convergence 
might be based on a universalist view of rights or on a positivist commitment to universalist values of 
international law set fourth in founding national documents; alternatively, instrumental, institutionalist 
concerns that “checks” on government from outside the polity are necessary to subserve domestic legal 
values may support a posture of convergence. Convergence might have weaker and stronger versions, 
entailing different forms of presumption. Scholars have made arguments for cosmopolitan approaches 
to the interpretation of basic rights, and some national constitutions manifest this posture incorpo-
rating specific international human rights instruments into their constitutions or treating them as of 
constitutional stature» (jackson, 2010: 8-9).
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Here, international law has been used to reinforce a black-or-white distinction 
between authoritarianism and democracy.
Besides explicitly qualifying the military rule as a «dictatorship», courts in 
Argentina also use the expression «state terrorism» to qualify what has happened 
in the country between 1976 and 1983, incorporating the narrative established 
by the National Commission on the disappearance of persons (also known by 
the Spanish acronym Conadep; the first truth commission ever) 23 to judicial rul-
ings. The choice of words reveals the explicit antagonism that courts established 
between authoritarian and democratic rule, and it of course has practical im-
plications. While prosecutions in Argentina frame human rights violations as 
«crimes against humanity» perpetrated by an illegitimate government, courts in 
Chile classify a very similar set of acts as «clandestine practices» that were mostly 
disconnected with the broader political structure of governance, incorporating 
pinochet’s authoritarian amnesty into democracy.
5. Chile: Continuous Authoritarian Legality with Disruptions
Although Chile has also implemented the global norm of individual account-
ability, including quantitatively prosecuting more dictatorship criminals than 
Argentina 24, the legal path to accountability has been substantively different. 
There are at least three distinctive features. First, while impunity measures were 
approved under democratic rule in Argentina, Chile’s amnesty law dates back to 
1978, in the midst of pinochet’s military regime (1973-1990). Second, in Argen-
tina, both the courts and the parliament have been successfully mobilized against 
the amnesty law, which led not only to a declaration of unconstitutionality but 
also to the derogation of the law, whereas amnesty is still valid in Chile. Third, 
Argentina has converged with international law without any ruling against it. 
Chile, on the other hand, was convicted in the 2006 Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights Almonacid Arellano ruling, with which it has never fully com-
plied.
These specific features together set in a broader contrasting picture: while 
the Argentinean dictatorship, facing high rates of disapproval, collapsed in 1983 
after military defeat in the Falklands/malvinas war, pinochet’s regime ended in 
1990, one year after being defeated in a national referendum where 43% of the 
population supported him for a new eight-year term and 55% wanted open elec-
tions. This divisive scenario was never truly resolved, as shown by the yearly con-
flicts in the streets of Santiago de Chile on every anniversary of the coup d’état. 
If the Argentinean pathway can be seen as one of rupture, the Chilean one seems 
more like one of continuity with disruptions and evolutions.
In 1990, Chilean amnesty law faced a judicial challenge in the Supreme Court. 
Victims and relatives claimed that the law was not to be compatible with the new 
democratic rule, but the Supreme Court rejected this argument. meanwhile, in 
23 Hayner, 2010: 7-18.
24 See Balardini, 2013.
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the very same year, a national truth commission was established. The so-called 
Rettig report from the commission would be launch in 1991, recognizing that at 
least 2,279 persons were killed for political reasons 25 and increasing public pres-
sure against impunity.
Some progress regarding accountability happened in the following years 
when civil society organizations explored loopholes in the 1978 law’s text, initi-
ating prosecutions for crimes not explicitly covered by the amnesty 26. Thus, how 
did Chilean courts use international law and the global norm of individual ac-
countability? In 1998, when ruling the Pedro Poblete Cordoba case, the Chilean 
Supreme Court encompassed two key concepts from international law in an in-
terpretation of domestic amnesty 27. First, it introduced the prohibition of «blan-
ket amnesties» under international law, stating that all alleged violations must be 
investigated, clarified and prosecuted prior to being amnestied. Second, it ruled 
that as Chile had declared a «state of war» during military rule, the provisions 
from the Geneva Conventions must applied to prisoners under state custody. 
Some rule of law gaps were recognized, with international law helping to limit 
impunity, but the courts have never fully recognized the regime’s illegality.
In contrast to what happened in Argentina, at this point, international law 
was not mobilized to set up legal/illegal differentiations challenging domestic 
legal provisions. Rather, it was used to improve interpretations of domestic law. 
Courts started to build a set of arguments where some crimes, such as forced dis-
appearances, were framed as kidnappings associated with inhumane treatment. 
Under the argument that kidnapping was already a crime according to Chilean 
law in the 1970s, that inhumane treatment during the state of war violates the 
Geneva Conventions, and that the prisoners had not been released and their 
remains had not been found, courts found legal bases for prosecution not by 
challenging the amnesty law as illegal but by circumventing it.
In Chile’s constitution, human rights are recognized as «a limitation to state 
sovereignty» 28, but they do not have any special constitutional rank. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court may refer to international law for interpretative or subsidiary 
criteria but not as a binding normative source with a hierarchical prerogative 
over domestic statutes. Even without an institutional architecture as favorable 
as that in Argentina, Chilean courts were able to start prosecuting human rights 
crimes by creating legal exceptions in the authoritarian legality framework. So-
cial pressure for accountability grew strong as former dictator Augusto pinochet 
was arrested in London, in October 1998 29, and with the launch of the Valech 
report, from the second Chilean national truth commission, in November 2004. 
All these elements combined with the Inter-American ruling against Chilean am-
nesty law in 2006 30, pushing courts toward a broader recognition of some of the 
repressive actions of pinochet’s regime as unlawful.
25 Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación Chile, 2013.
26 Collins, 2010.
27 Chile, 1998.
28 Chile, Constitución Política de Chile, article 5th.
29 See Roht-Arriaza, 2005.
30 Inter-American Human Rights Court, 2006.
354 mARCELO TORELLY
Chile’s answer to the Almonacid Arellano ruling clearly illustrates a prac-
tice of constitutional engagement 31. The Inter-American Court determined that 
the Chilean State must «ensure that decree Law No. 2.191 does not continue 
to hinder further investigation [...] as well as the identification and, if appli-
cable, punishment of those responsible» for «the extra-legal execution of mr. 
Almonacid-Arellano» as well as for «those responsible for similar violations in 
Chile» 32.
Chile has never fully complied, but just a few weeks after the international 
ruling, the Supreme Court introduced its rationale into domestic law interpreta-
tion, noting for the first time the «imprescritibilidad» of crimes against humanity 
(i. e., they are not subject to statutes of limitation) and quoting the Inter-Amer-
ican Court decision in order to strengthen its general argument on this prohibi-
tion from international law 33.
Even though it has not been fully complied with, the Inter-American Court 
ruling has been mobilized in several other cases 34 to produce constitutional en-
gagement enforcing human rights boundaries to domestic amnesty. distinctively 
from Argentina, where international law was introduced in the transitional rule 
of law scenario both as a positive legal provision preventing the application of 
statutes of limitation and as an argument against impunity measure’s legality, in 
Chile, it has worked only as a limitation to an amnesty provision considered valid 
and legal. The amnesty law in Chile was not derogated. However, international 
law arguments have thickened the spectrum of prosecutorial possibilities, where 
loopholes in the amnesty law have been used, and limitations from international 
law have been applied to allow broader accountability.
In this more divisive social environment, it comes as no surprise that Chilean 
courts did not embrace a historical interpretation that treats the military rule 
as an unlawful dictatorship. While in the Argentinean case, legal terms such as 
«dictatorship» and «state terrorism» were incorporated into the legal rulings, 
in Chile, the prevalent trend is to refer to a social conflict where a «state of 
war» was declared. Legal rulings did not engage against authoritarian legality: 
they focused on situations where no legality at all was followed, such as forced 
disappearances and illegal detentions, excluding amnesty on a concrete basis. In 
the Chilean judicial narrative of the military regime, the rule of law gap seems 
smaller than that in the Argentinean account.
31 In jackson’s typology constitutional engagement is «founded on commitments to judicial delib-
eration and open to the possibilities of either harmony or dissonance between national self-understand-
ings and transnational norms. [...] a posture of engagement might assume simple that interpretation 
of national fundamental law can be improved by engagement with transnational norms, on those oc-
casions where lawyers or jurists have some relevant knowledge and where issues are relatively “open” 
within the domestic discourse. Alternatively, an engagement posture might proceed on the idea that 
the concept of domestic constitutional law itself must now be understood in relation to transnational 
norms, an assumption that might argue for engagement with the transnational across a wider range of 
cases and issues» (jackson, 2010: 09).
32 Inter-American Human Rights Court, 2006: ruling section, para. 5-6.
33 Corte Suprema de Chile, 2006.
34 E. g.: Corte Suprema de Chile. Segunda Sala Criminal. Rol núm. 3125-04, 13 january, 2007; 
Corte Suprema de Chile. Segunda Sala Criminal. Rol núm. 3452-06, 10 may, 2007.
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Chilean application of the global norm of individual accountability mixes 
some enforcement of international human rights law with the preservation of the 
1978 amnesty law inside the framework of 1980s pinochet Constitution (still in 
force). When convictions happen, a gradual (or «half») prescription is applied, 
limiting the terms of imprisonment 35. In contrast to Argentina, where interna-
tional law was mobilized to fully disregard the military rule, in divisive Chile, its 
use is limited to the recognition of certain kinds of severe violations as excluded 
from amnesty.
6.  Brazil: Identity and Continuity Between Authoritarian and Democratic 
Legal Orders
As Chile did in 1978, the Brazilian dictatorship approved an amnesty law 
in 1979. Between 1974 and 1979, Brazilian Civil Society advocated for «broad, 
general and unrestricted» amnesty for all political prisoners and regime oppo-
nents, including those in armed resistance, but the regime ultimately approved 
a limited amnesty provision excluding armed resistance members, that courts 
interpret as «bilateral amnesty», where they extend its effects to military per-
sonnel involved in human rights violations 36. In addition, as Chileans did in 
the 1990s, Brazilians went to the Supreme Court in 2008 to challenge impu-
nity, claiming that the new democratic constitution from 1988 was incompat-
ible with impunity for gross human rights violations and that amnesty should 
be granted only to those who opposed the military rule. However, in 2010, 
the Court upheld the legal interpretation, assuring bilateral and unlimited 
effects 37.
The very same year, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights issued a 
decision against Brazil declaring that «the provisions of the Brazilian Amnesty 
Law that prevent the investigation and punishment of serious human rights vio-
lations are not compatible with the American Convention, lack legal effect, and 
cannot continue as obstacles for the investigation of the facts of the present case, 
neither for the identification and punishment of those responsible, nor can they 
have equal or similar impact regarding other serious violations of human rights 
enshrined in the American Convention which occurred in Brazil» 38. However, 
in contrast to Chile and Argentina, Brazil has neither engaged nor converged 
35 According to Roht-Arriaza, «From 2007 on, that court [Chile’s Supreme Court] has employed 
a device known as “gradual (or half) prescription” to reduce the sentences of convicted members 
of the security forces. “Gradual prescription”, according to section 103 of the criminal procedure 
code, allows a judge to reduce the sentence based on the amount of time between the commission of 
the crime and the moment when the defendant was charged; if more than half the applicable statute 
of limitations had run at that point, gradual prescription requires that two mitigating circumstances 
and no aggravating circumstances be added to the range of permissible sentencing options. Gradual 
prescription, because it is based on the passage of time and not the nature of the crime, according to 
a Supreme Court majority applies even in cases of international crimes where no statute of limitations 
can apply» (Roht-Arriaza, 2015: 378).
36 Abrão, Torelly, 2012.
37 For broader analysis on the topic, see Torelly, 2012: 299-352.
38 Inter-American Human Rights Courts, 2010: paragraph 325(3).
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with the international ruling. Courts keep resisting international law and mostly 
ignore the Inter-American ruling.
Why does Brazil resist the global norm of individual accountability? Two 
interconnected features help to answer this question. First, the way domestic 
institutions deal with international human rights norms. Second, the way the 
democratic judiciary relates current legal order to dictatorship authoritarian 
legality.
Concerning institutional architecture, Brazil stands in between the Argen-
tinean and Chilean models. Until a decade ago, the new democratic constitu-
tion had very similar provisions to those found in Chile, stating that «Brazil’s 
international relations should be governed» taking into account «the prevalence 
of human rights» 39. No special rank was granted to international human rights 
norms, which leads to a general judicial interpretation that international human 
rights norms have a status similar to ordinary legal provisions.
After Constitutional Amendment 45, in 2004, all human rights norms rati-
fied by a qualified majority in the National Congress were granted constitu-
tional rank 40. Constitutional reform aimed to make clear that human rights 
norms have constitutional status in the domestic legal system, replicating the 
Argentinean institutional design but adding the need to have qualified majority 
approval. Notwithstanding, a judicial controversy was established regarding 
the legal rank of those international treaties ratified before the constitutional 
reform, including the American Convention on Human Rights and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Ruling over the controversy, the 
Supreme Court understood that those norms now have neither ordinary rank 
(as in Chile) nor constitutional rank (as in Argentina). Rather, they have a 
«supra legal» status 41, standing above ordinary rules but below constitutional 
norms.
This institutional architecture is more favorable to international human rights 
than the Chilean one, as the only occasion in which the enforcement of human 
rights norms is prevented is when a collision with constitutional norms occurs. 
This leads us to the second feature explaining resistance to the global norm of 
individual accountability in Brazil: the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
amnesty law and the dictatorship’s authoritarian legality.
When ruling on the claim against amnesty for gross human rights violations, 
the Supreme Court has argued that the 1979 amnesty law was Brazil’s inaugural 
step toward democracy and was «constitutionalized». Brazil’s new democratic 
constitution was written in a Constitutional Assembly convened by an amend-
ment to the old military rule constitution of 1967-1969 42. This amendment, re-
iterates the text of the 1979 amnesty law, which has led some radical Supreme 
Court members, such as justice Gilmar mendes, to understand the «bilateral» 
39 Brazil’s Federal Republic Constitution, article 4(II).
40 Brazil’s Federal Republic Constitution, article 5 (para. 03).
41 piovesan, 2008.
42 Brazil. Constitutional Amendment n.º 26/1985 (to 1967-69 Constitution).
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amnesty as a pre-constitutional commitment limiting the scope of the national 
constitutional assembly 43 and the more moderate majority to rule that the consti-
tutional content of the amnesty prevents judicial review of this piece of law. Ac-
cording to the Court, only the National Congress has the prerogative to change 
the amnesty law, with no regard to eventual problems concerning retroatio in 
pejus to which this decision would lead.
In this sense, the Supreme Court’s historical narrative does not reject the 
military rule and its amnesty as incompatible with the rule of law. Rather, it ac-
tually establishes a legal continuity between authoritarian and democratic rule 
by applying Carl Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre idea of constitutional identity and 
continuity 44.
The Inter-American ruling took place after the Supreme Court upheld the 
law, so the amnesty controversy will be back on the Court’s agenda in the com-
ing years. meanwhile, something has changed: regardless of the Supreme Court’s 
decision, considering the Gomes Lund ruling, federal prosecutors have opened 
190 investigations and initiated prosecutions against at least 10 former state offi-
cials engaged in repression 45. The key argument is that regardless of the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of a general amnesty provision, international law establishes 
some legal exceptions 46. In a legal context where courts decline to establish a 
stronger distinction between authoritarian and democratic rule, rather the op-
posite occurs, where legal continuity and constitutional pre-commitments are 
affirmed by the Supreme Court. This way of argumentation uses a similar ap-
proach to the one that succeeded in Chile, as it poses limits to amnesty without 
questioning the regime’s authoritarian legality.
Regardless of the broader institutional openness, the bigger the social divi-
sion regarding the historical understanding of the conflict, the smaller the scope 
of the application of international law as a subsidiary source of law. While Chile 
has had two truth commissions investigating and recognizing violations, push-
ing society (and courts) toward a more critical approach to the military rule, 
Brazilian armed forces still deny that human rights violations occurred during 
military rule. The smaller historical accountability is reflected in courts under-
standing of the law’s adequacy in the previous regime, with judges repeating 
the regime’s historical narrative of a conflict where both sides exceeded the 
limits and adopting a bilateral amnesty that brings peace. Without strong public 
recognition of human rights violations, courts’ historical narrative perpetrates 
what Cohen describes as a «state of denial» regarding human rights violations, 
preventing the incorporation of legal tools from international law regarding 
crimes against humanity 47.
43 Torelly, 2013, 55.
44 justice mendes actually quotes the Spanish translation of Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre to justify 
that the 1987-1988 Constitutional Assembly that wrote Brazilian democratic constitution could not 
change the «bilateral» amnesty clause (page 08 of his individual vote).
45 See ministério publico Federal (Brazil). Grupo de Trabalho justiça de Transição, 2014.
46 ministério publico Federal (Brazil). 2.ª Câmara de Coordenação e Revisão, 2011.
47 Cohen, 2013.
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Table 01 summarizes some comparative features regarding transitional justice 
and accountability in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
Table 01. Amnesty and Fundamental Rights: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
Argentina Brazil Chile
military Rule 1976-1983 1964-1985 1973-1990







1987, 1989, 1990 1979 1978
New Constitution After 
military Rule 1994 1988 No
Amnesty derogation 2003 No No
Amnesty judicial Review Yes No No
Truth Commission Reports 1984 2014 1991, 2004/2011*
Criminal Convictions Yes No Yes
Inter-American HR Court 
Conviction No 2010 2006
International HR Norms 
domestic Status Constitutional Supra Legal Ordinary
Reaction to International 






Revolution State of War
Relationship with previous 
Legal Order (regarding 
impunity)
Rupture Continuity Continuity with disruptions
* Original report/Second report.
7. Tentative Conclusions: A Problem of Adequacy
Strictly focusing on institutional architecture, one may argue that Argentina’s 
tendency for constitutional convergence regarding the global norm of individual 
accountability derives from the rank granted to human rights norms in the 1994 
constitutional reform. With no disregard to this argument, examples from Brazil 
and Chile bring some doubts to this assumption. While international law in Bra-
zil has a superior rank to that in Chile, the latter has moved into an engagement 
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model, while the former has resisted implementing international law as a rel-
evant criterion when addressing gross human rights violations of the past regime. 
Even the Argentinean case may relativize this argument, as accountability, with 
its ebbs and flows, began even before the constitutional reform.
A well-accepted argument in political science regarding legal change and ac-
countability focuses on the political level. Kathryn Sikkink argues that «political 
opportunities [for accountability] don’t exist in the abstract but need to be per-
ceived and constructed» further noting that «political actors in Argentina face 
a more conductive context for their demands after the transition to democracy, 
yet these groups were also more likely than some of their counterparts in other 
countries to perceive and create political opportunities» 48. Translating this argu-
ment from political science to legal theory, one may say that when social actors 
increase political tension, they challenge pre-established patterns regarding the 
law’s social adequacy.
Transitional rule of law problems challenge law’s consistency, showing that 
stable rules from authoritarianism are socially inadequate for democratic consti-
tutional governance (i. e., majoritarian governance limited by human rights). A 
rule of law gap is mainly a problem regarding the democratic adequacy of formal 
rules in the previous regime. When deciding transitional rule of law cases, courts 
embrace a historical narrative about the previous regime. The more this histori-
cal narrative emphasize the previous legal order’s unlawfulness, the greater the 
chances for international law to be called into action in helping reestablish the 
law’s consistency on a more adequate level to fill rule of law gaps.
Historical narratives are built mainly outside the legal system. Thus, both 
judgments regarding the social legitimacy of previous regimes and the amount 
of knowledge concerning human rights violations play a role. In Argentina and 
Chile, broader knowledge of human rights violations increased the pressure for 
courts to react to the law’s inadequacy. In the first case, courts have incorporated 
the narrative regarding «state terrorism» to justify the application of the most se-
vere criminal law tools available in both domestic and international legal orders. 
In the second and more divisive social scenario, courts do not classify the previ-
ous regime as illegal. The word «dictatorship» is missing, but the truth-seeking 
process introduced a narrative on gross human rights violations that allows a 
limited use of international law concepts together with domestic provisions, as 
those crimes were not admitted even under authoritarian legality.
Social perceptions regarding the previous regime help explain why Argentina 
was better able to enforce international human rights law regardless of having 
never been ruled against by the regional human rights court. Chile was able to 
partially implement Almonacid Arellano and promote some accountability inso-
far the social perception of pinochet’s regime started to change. This culminated 
in an apology by the judges for its omission during military rule 49 and the decla-
ration by president Bachelet that the derogation of amnesty law will be a priority 
48 Sikkink, 2011: 82.
49 BBC, 2013.
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in her new term in office 50. Brazilian resistance to the global norm of individual 
accountability regardless of its more open institutional architecture illustrates 
the key argument stated here: legal change at the consistency level only occurs 
after broader change in the perception of the law’s adequacy. Institutional ar-
chitecture favoring the incorporation of international law fails to succeed when 
courts do not recognize gaps of any kind in domestic rule of law, and this rec-
ognition demands a historical narrative connected to a substantive view of the 
past regime.
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